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Abstract: This paper utilizes a Markov-switching framework to model excess returns in 
federal funds futures contracts. This framework identifies a high-volatility state where 
excess returns are large, positive, and volatile and a low-volatility state where excess 
returns have a lower volatility and are small in absolute value. Federal funds futures 
rates require adjustment for excess returns only in the high-volatility state. Intermeeting 
rate cuts of the federal funds rate target always correspond with the high-volatility 
regime and can explain much of the variation in excess returns. This paper also 
examines previous return models and helps clarify the relationship between excess 
returns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. In real-time forecasting, however, 
the unadjusted futures rates outperform three different forecasting models. This result 
strengthens the case for unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy 
expectations. 
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Federal funds futures contracts are popular tools for estimating monetary policy expectations. Both
academic researchers and private sector forecasters use these contracts to derive the expected path
of the federal funds rate over the coming months. Recent research, however, provides evidence that
futures rates require adjustment for excess returns. Under the expectations hypothesis, federal
funds futures contracts should not dier systematically from the average eective federal funds
rate over the contract expiration month. Using notation from Piazzesi and Swanson (2006), this
implies: f
(n)
t = Et[rt+n]; where f
(n)
t is the contract rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t and
Et[rt+n] is the expected value of the eective federal funds rate over month t + n. Any dierence
between the futures rate and the actual federal funds rate over the expiration month re
ects returns
in excess of the risk-free rate. If signicant excess returns exist in the futures contracts, the futures
rates require adjustment to accurately estimate monetary policy expectations.
This paper utilizes a Markov-switching framework to model excess returns in federal funds fu-
tures contracts. This framework identies a high-volatility state where excess returns are large,
positive, and volatile and a low-volatility state where excess returns have a lower volatility and are
small in absolute value. Federal funds futures rates require adjustment for excess returns only in
the high-volatility state. Intermeeting rate cuts of the federal funds rate target always correspond
with the high-volatility regime and can explain much of the variation in excess returns. This paper
also examines previous excess return models and helps clarify the relationship between excess re-
turns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. In real-time forecasting, however, the unadjusted
futures rates outperform three dierent forecasting models. This result strengthens the case for
unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
Previous work generally rejects the expectations hypothesis and nds evidence of some type of
excess returns in federal funds futures contracts. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) nd that average
excess returns vary from 3 basis points on a 1-month ahead contract to 30 basis points on a 6-month
ahead contract. Durham (2003) and Sack (2004) use slightly dierent time periods of data and nd
positive average excess returns which increase across longer maturity contracts. While previous
work does nd evidence of average excess returns, studies dier on their conclusions about time-
varying excess returns. Using the term-structure of the implied federal funds rates, Durham (2003)
nds highly volatile time-varying excess returns on short term contracts. Under the assumption
that policy expectations level out over time, Sack (2004) determines that excess returns increase
with contract length and vary over time. Durham (2003) also nds con
icting evidence about time-
varying excess returns using two dierent asset-pricing approaches. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006)
determine that excess returns in the 1988-2005 sample period tend to be predictable and move
countercyclical with the business cycle. They also show that ignoring these excess returns biases
forecasts of the expected path of monetary policy.
22 Data
This paper uses 30-day federal funds futures contracts purchased from the Chicago Board of Trade.
The payout on these futures contracts is the dierence between the contract rate and actual average
eective federal funds rate over the expiration month.1 This paper uses language and notation






t   rt+n; (1)
where rt+n is the ex post realized average eective federal funds rate over month t + n and f
(n)
t is
the futures rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t.2 I sample the futures rates across contracts
ranging from 1 to 6 months ahead from the last day of each month t.
Changes in the Federal Reserve's communication policy govern the sample selection for this
paper. The Federal Reserve began announcing changes to the federal funds rate target after May
1994 and began releasing the specic target rate after July 1995. These changes in Federal Re-
serve policy drastically increase the information available to the federal funds futures market which
decreases the volatility of the excess returns.3 Most previous studies examining excess returns in
federal funds futures do not recognize the signicance of this policy change and use sample periods
that cover both the before and after 1994 period.4 This paper extends the work of Piazzesi and
Swanson (2006) who use the 1988-2005 sample period.5 Although futures rates are available from
1988, my sample consists of 139 monthly observations from January 1995 to July 2006. This sam-
ple period avoids possible market microstructure issues associated with this policy change and is a
more accurate representation of the current futures market.
Constructing excess returns using equation (1) introduces a potentially problematic economet-
ric issue. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Hakkio (1981) discuss that an n-month ahead forward
rate like (1) will suer from n   1 lags of autocorrelation due to contract overlap. Appendix A
examines this issue in detail and shows that the results in this paper are robust with respect to
autocorrelation and alternative specications.
1See Piazzesi and Swanson (2006), Krueger and Kuttner (1996), or Hamilton (2007) for a detailed description of
the federal funds futures market.
2Although futures contracts are \marked to market" everyday, I use equation (1) to represent the excess returns
of the n-month ahead contract at time t. The appendix of Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) contains more information
regarding how the futures contracts are \marked to market".
3See Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) Figure 8 as evidence to the decreased volatility of excess returns in the post-1994
period.
4Urich and Wachtel (2001) discuss the changes to Federal Reserve policy over this period and the resulting nancial
market responses.
5Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) do show that the average excess return is signicant and positive over the 1988-
1994 and 1995-2005 subperiods. They also show that their coecient estimates of their risk adjustment mechanism
converge to their full-sample estimates by 1994.
33 Excess Returns in Federal Funds Futures Contracts
3.1 Markov-Switching Average Excess Return
The Markov-switching framework in this paper derives from Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson
(1999) and allows the mean and variance of the average excess return to vary with an unobserved
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where pij = P[St = jjSt 1 = i] for i = 0;1 and j = 0;1. A nonlinear iterative lter formulates
probabilistic estimates of the unobserved state variable using the data and constructs the log-
likelihood function. The log-likelihood function is maximized numerically using the Nedler-Mead
simplex algorithm over a large grid of starting values. Using the Markov-chain from (2), this paper
models excess returns using the following specication:
rx
(n)





t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, St is the unob-
served state variable, and "
(n)
t+n  N(0;(St)2). The Markov-switching framework of (3) permits,
but does not require, both (n)(St) and (St) to vary with the unobserved state variable. While
both (n)(St) and (St) must switch regimes at the same time, the data determines the timing and
frequency of the switches.
The switching framework detects two distinct states in the average excess returns. The frame-
work identies a high-volatility state where the average excess returns are large, positive, and very
volatile and a low-volatility state where the average excess returns have a lower volatility and are
small in absolute value. The results of equation (3) appear in Table 1 where St = 0 corresponds
to the high-volatility state and St = 1 corresponds to the low-volatility state. As the name of each
regime implies, the Markov-switching framework nds that the state-dependent variance under
St = 0 is considerably higher than under St = 1. Across all contract lengths, the state-dependent
variance is at least four times larger in the high-volatility regime. The average excess returns in
the high-volatility regime are highly signicant across all contract lengths and range from 7.63
basis points on a 1-month ahead contract to 93.20 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract. In
the low-volatility regime, the excess returns are small and insignicant for the 1 to 3-month ahead
contracts and small, negative, and signicant for the 4 to 6-month ahead contracts. On average,
the federal funds futures market over-predicts the average eective federal funds rate by over 25
basis points in the high-volatility state across 2-month and longer contracts. This result contrasts
with the low-volatility state where the futures rates miss the average eective federal funds rate
by 5 basis points or less in all contracts on average. Conditional on being in regime St = i, the
probability of remaining in that regime is approximately 0.86 for i = 0 and 0.97 for i = 1 for all
2-month and longer ahead contracts.
4The ltered and smoothed probabilities of being in the high-volatility state appear in Figure
1. Each panel shows the results for a dierent contract length where the dashed lines correspond
to the ltered probabilities and the solid lines denote the smoothed probabilities. The ltered
probability of regime i at time t is given by P[St = ij
t], where 
t re
ects information from all
previous and current observations at time t. The smoothed probability of regime i at time t is given
by P[St = ij
T], where 
T re
ects information from all past, current, and future observations at
time t. While the probabilities do dier slightly across contract length, certain distinct patterns
emerge in the probability plots across all contract lengths. The federal funds futures market enters
the high-volatility state during the middle of 1998 and returns to the low-volatility state by the
beginning of 1999 in all contracts. In addition, all contracts switch to the high-volatility state again
in 2000 and switch back at the end of 2001. The Markov-switching framework nds that the futures
market enters the low-volatility state in all contracts by 2003.
The two distinct states from the Markov-switching model suggest dierent conclusions regarding
the expectations hypothesis and the need to adjust futures rates for excess returns. Futures rates in
the high-volatility state reject the expectations hypothesis by the signicance of the average excess
return. In the high-volatility state, futures rates clearly require adjustment for excess returns in
order to accurately measure monetary policy expectations. This conclusion diers starkly from
the ndings of the low-volatility state. Futures rates in the low-volatility state generally follow the
expectations hypothesis and do not require adjustment for excess returns. The Markov-switching
framework shows that excess returns matter greatly in some periods and matter little at other
times. Understanding when futures rates require adjustment is crucial in using these contracts to
derive the correct expected path of monetary policy.
3.2 Intermeeting Rate Cuts by the FOMC
Event-study literature, such as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), G urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2005), and Davig and Gerlach (2006), studies the reaction of asset prices to monetary policy. This
eld often excludes intermeeting moves of the federal funds rate target by the FOMC in its analysis
due to the unexpected nature and large eect of such policy actions.6 These moves drastically
aect the federal funds futures market by suddenly changing the eective federal funds rate and
the market's expectations for the upcoming FOMC meetings. Over the 1995-2006 sample period of
this paper, the FOMC makes intermeeting rate cuts on October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April
18, 2001; and September 17, 2001. The FOMC cut the federal funds rate target by 25 basis points
for the intermeeting move during 1998 and by 50 basis points for the three moves in 2001. The
large and unexpected shock of these moves to the futures market could help explain the existence
of the high-volatility state in the excess returns.
6Intermeeting moves are surprise policy actions that do not occur at one of the regularly scheduled meetings of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
5Figure 2 plots the ltered probability of the high-volatility regime across all contract lengths
where the shaded areas indicate contracts aected by intermeeting rate cuts of the FOMC. The
shaded regions re
ect contracts where an intermeeting rate cut takes place in the interval [t;t+n],
where n denotes the contract length. Intuitively, the shaded region indicates that an intermeeting
rate cut takes place between the sample of the futures rate at time t and the expiration of the
contract at time t + n. The interval length increases with contract length due to the increasing
length of time between the sample of the futures rate and the contract expiration. Since the futures
market does not expect these intermeeting moves, I use only the ltered probability in Figure 3
since it only conditions on past and current observations.
The shaded areas in Figure 2 always correspond with a change to the high-volatility regime.
Using the 1-month ahead contracts, we see that each intermeeting rate cut from 1995-2006 cor-
relates with a switch to the high-volatility regime. Additionally, the length of time spent in the
high-volatility regime around each intermeeting move increases with contract length. In 2001, three
distinct switches and reversals occur in the 1-month ahead contract which gradually length to one
longer duration high-volatility regime in the 5 and 6-month ahead contracts. The timing of the
switch to the high-volatility regime moves back one previous period with each additional month
contract due to contract overlap. While the probability plots dier slightly across contract length,
intermeeting rate cuts correlate with the changes in regime across all contracts in 1998 and 2000-
2001.
3.3 Alternative Model using Ordinary Least Squares
Intermeeting rate cuts correspond with much of the existence of the high-volatility state identied
by the Markov-switching framework. An ordinary least squares regression with a intermeeting rate
cut variable is a natural alternative to the Markov-switching framework. This alternative model
allows for comparison with previous studies and provides regression statistics (such as R2) which
are unavailable in the switching regressions.7









t+n is the excess return on the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, Dt represents
the intermeeting rate cut variable, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the error term. Equation (4) uses Newey-West
(1987) standard errors with (n   1) lags to allow for the autocorrelation under equation (1).8 Dt
is assigned the value of the intermeeting rate cut in basis points if an intermeeting rate cut oc-
curs in the interval [t;t + n] and a value of 0 otherwise. For example, Dt takes the value of 25
7All of the R
2 values that appear in this paper are adjusted R
2 values.
8The results are robust with respect to more lags or alternative specications which reduce the autocorrelation
(See Appendix A).
6for the 1-month ahead contract sample at the end of September 1998. I also allow the eect of
intermeeting rates cuts to be cumulative if two intermeeting moves occur during the sample to
expiration interval. For example, Dt is assigned the value of 100 for 6-month ahead rate at the end
of December 2000 since two intermeeting rate cuts of 50 basis points each occur between t and t+n.9
The results for equation (4) appear in Table 2 and show that this model ts the excess returns
data well. The eect of an intermeeting rate cut by the FOMC is statistically signicant at a high
level and increases with contract length. A 50 basis point intermeeting rate cut correlates with
32 basis points of excess returns on a 1-month ahead contract and almost 100 basis points on a
6-month ahead contract. The intermeeting rate cut coecient is less than one-to-one with the
excess returns on the short term contracts because the payout on the excess returns depends on
the average eective federal funds rate over the contract expiration month. On the longer term
contracts, the larger than one-to-one coecient on the intermeeting rate cut variable shows that
an intermeeting move also correlates with additional future unexpected policy loosening before the
contract expiration. For contracts longer than 2-months, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
a zero average excess return. For the 1 and 2-month contracts, equation (4) nds a small average
excess return of about 1 basis point per month. Intermeeting rate cuts are able to explain much of
the variation in the excess returns. The R2 values for equation (4) range from 0.40 on a 1-month
ahead contract to over 0.58 on 3-month and longer ahead contracts.
The results from this alternative OLS model have signicant implications for the expectations
hypothesis and the possible adjustment of federal funds futures rates. The previous results show
that, after controlling for large monetary policy shocks due to intermeeting rate cuts, federal funds
futures rates generally follow the expectations hypothesis. With the exception of a possible 1 basis
point per month adjustment in the 1 and 2-month ahead contracts, federal funds futures rates do
not require adjustment except due to intermeeting moves by the FOMC.
The values for the average excess returns in the prior results are much smaller and less signif-
icant than previous estimates in the literature. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) and Durham (2003)
run many models similar to (4) with a variety of dierent right hand side variables. Using only
the 1-month ahead contracts, Durham (2003) nds a positive average excess return of 3 to 7 basis
points over the 1988-2003 sample period after controlling for various factors. The average excess
return is signicant in all but one of his models. His regressions, however, cannot explain much
of the variation of the excess returns and nds little signicance of any business cycle or other
variables. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) uses a recession dummy variable and nds a signicant
average excess return of over 2 basis points on a 1-month ahead contract to 25 basis points on a
6-month ahead contract. Although the recession dummy is signicant across most contract lengths,
the R2 values of those regressions range from only 0.03 to 0.17 over the 1988-2005 period or 0.07
9The results of the alternative OLS model are robust to the specication of Dt as a simple 0-1 dummy variable for
intermeeting rate cuts. Using the intermeeting rate cut variable as dened in (4) as opposed to the simple dummy
variable gives a more easily interpreted coecient estimate in the results.
7to 0.25 over the 1995-2006 period. Intermeeting rate cuts can explain much more of the variation
in excess returns than business cycle or other variables.
3.4 Previous Risk-Adjustment Mechanisms
Consistent with the ndings of the Markov-switching framework, Piazzesi and Swanson (2006)
nds evidence of time-variation in the excess returns on federal funds futures contracts. They nd
that excess returns on futures contracts tend to be predictable and strongly countercyclical over
the 1988-2005 sample period. Using nonfarm payroll employment and the current futures rate,
Piazzesi and Swanson create a risk-adjustment mechanism which produces better forecasts of mon-
etary policy expectations over their sample period.
The Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) risk-adjustment mechanism is as follows:
rx
(n)
t+n = (n) + 
(n)







where NFPt 1 is the year-over-year percentage change from time t 13 to t 1 in the logarithm of
nonfarm payroll employment. The NFPt 1 series for employment growth contains the real-time
data estimates known at time t using the real-time data archive from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The results for equation (5) over the 1995-2006 sample period of this paper appear
in Table 3 and agree with the ndings of Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) for the 1988-2005 sample
period. Nonfarm payrolls and the current futures rate correlate with excess returns. The R2 values
for these regressions range from 0.03 on a 1-month ahead contract to 0.25 on the 6-month ahead
contract. Excess returns have a negative relationship with the change in nonfarm payrolls with
a coecient that varies from -0.02 to -0.47 across contract length. The coecient on the current
futures rate of the n-month ahead contract ranges from 0.02 on a 1-month ahead contract to 0.30
on a 6-month ahead contract. While the R2 values for (5) are slightly lower than those reported
by Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) over the 1988-2005 sample period, the coecient estimates and
signicance are in line with previous estimates.
Since intermeeting rate cuts are correlated with business cycles, the results of models (4) and
(5) make drawing conclusions of about the exact nature of excess returns dicult. I propose adding
NFPt 1 and f
(n)
t into the OLS intermeeting rate cut model to clarify the relationship between
excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. Over the 1995-2006 sample period, I
estimate the following model:
rx
(n)
t+n = (n) + 
(n)




t + (n)Dt + "
(n)
t+n; (6)
where Dt represents the intermeeting rate cut eect variable. The results of model (6) appear
in Table 4. After controlling for the eect of intermeeting rate cuts, NFPt 1 and f
(n)
t do not
explain as much of the variation in excess returns as the previous results in Table 3 show. Adding
NFPt 1 and f
(n)
t to model (4) only increases the R2 by less than 0.03 in the 1 to 4-month ahead
8contracts. Adding the Piazzesi and Swanson business cycle variables only adds 0.05 and 0.10 to the
R2 values for the 5 and 6-month ahead contracts which is much smaller than the 0.19 and 0.25 R2





2 are all roughly half as large as previous estimates from Table 3. While most of the coecients
remain statistically signicant, this change in shows that not properly accounting for intermeeting
rate cuts biases the coecient estimates away from zero. The coecients on the intermeeting rate
cuts variable remain highly statistically signicant and are similar to the estimates from Table 2.
Adding NFPt 1 and f
(n)
t into the OLS intermeeting rate cut model helps clarify the relation-
ship between business cycles and intermeeting rate cuts on the excess returns over the 1995-2006
sample period. After controlling for the eect of intermeeting rate cuts by the FOMC, the change
in nonfarm payrolls and the current futures rate do not explain as much of the variation in excess
returns as previous estimates. Over the longer term 5 and 6-month ahead contracts, excess returns
do still have some correlation with business cycles, but that correlation is much smaller than the
results in Table 3. In addition, not controlling for intermeeting rate cuts biases the coecient
estimates of model (5) away from zero. The results from model (6) suggest that intermeeting rate
cuts, as opposed to business cycles, explain much of the variation in the excess returns over the
1995-2006 sample period.
3.5 Real-Time Forecasting
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) determine that excess returns in the 1988-2005 sample period are also
predictable using a regression on a constant, the change in nonfarm payrolls, and the current futures
rate. This section shows that this claim is not robust to the later 1995-2006 sample period. This re-
sult strengthens the case for unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
To evaluate the eectiveness of the excess return models, I perform pseudo out-of-sample fore-
casts using the unadjusted futures rates, the Markov-switching model from this paper, and the
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) model both with and without the intermeeting rate cut variable. I
use the period from January 1995-December 1998 to estimate parameters for the January 1999
forecast. I continue by adding the January 1999 observation to the estimation data and forecasting
the excess returns for the rest of my sample using a rolling endpoint regression.
The timing element of the excess returns data presents particular challenges to the forecasting
models. Forecasts are made at time t about the eective federal funds rate over month t + n,
where n denotes the contract length. The dierence between these two values represents the excess
return at time t. This gap between the forecast and the realization of the excess returns means that
the models can only use parameter estimates from models before t   n. The forecast can include
information up through time t, but the parameter estimates can only be determined from time t n
due to the timing lag in the creation of the excess returns in equation (1).




t+n = rt+n   Et[rt+n]; (7)
where  rx
(n)
t+n is the negative excess returns of the n-month ahead contract at time t. Under the




Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) reject the expectations hypothesis in favor of a time-varying excess
return and adjust futures rates for risk using equation (5) as follows:
Et[rt+n] = f
(n)
t   ((n) + 
(n)





I propose also adding an intermeeting rate cut variable, as in equation (6), to correct for the biases




t   ((n) + 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t + (n)Dt): (10)
Finally, a Markov-switching framework as in equation (3) has the ability to capture excess returns
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The vector [P(St+n = 0j
t n) P(St+n = 1j
t n)] forecasts the probability of being in each
respective state using the Markov-chain from (2) and the current ltered probability of each state
up through time t   n. The parameters from the Markov-chain are the estimates up through time
t   n using the Hamilton (1989) lter. These two probabilities are multiplied by the estimates of
the state-dependent average excess returns to create a single weighted average forecast for the two
states.10
10This forecasting model assumes that [P(St n = ij
t n)] = [P(St = ij
t n)] for i = 1;2 and then iterates on the
Markov-chain n times. This means that the econometrician runs the switching framework at time t using observations
through t   n, assumes that the probability of being in each state is the same at time t and time t   n and uses
that probability to make the forecast of the excess returns at time t + n. An alternative model does not make this
assumption and uses the probability up through t n and iterates on the Markov-chain 2n times to obtain a forecast
at time t + n. This alternative model, however, produces very similar quantitative results and identical implications
for predictability.
10The results for the the rolling endpoint predictive regression forecasts appear in Table 5. The
forecasting methods are evaluated with respect to mean error (ME) and root mean square error
(RMSE). Over 1 to 3-month ahead contracts, the unadjusted futures and both Piazzesi and Swan-
son (2006) models perform well. All three forecasting methods have similar root mean square error
values with the unadjusted futures edging slightly lower in the shorter term contracts. The unad-
justed futures do however make larger mean errors than either of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006)
models. Adding the intermeeting eect variable only slightly improves the performance of the Pi-
azzesi and Swanson (2006) model. For the 1 to 3-month ahead contracts, the Markov-switching
model performs very poorly with larger mean and root mean square errors. Using the probabil-
ity plots in Figure 1 and the work of Bessec and Bouabdallah (2005), the misclassication of the
future regimes most likely contributes to the poor performance of the switching model over the
shorter term contracts. Over the 4 to 6-month contracts, however, the unadjusted futures and the
Markov-switching model perform better than the Piazzesi and Swanson models. With respect to
RMSE, the unadjusted futures and the Markov-switching models have almost identical results. In
addition, the Markov-switching model makes smaller mean errors in the longer term contracts than
the unadjusted futures. The Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) models perform worse in the longer-term
contracts with larger root mean square errors. Adding the intermeeting eect variable, however,
slightly improves the forecasts by correcting for the biases in the coecients discussed in the pre-
vious section. The intermeeting eect variable improves the RMSE of the 6-month ahead basis
points by over 2 basis points. These results indicate that neither of the Piazzesi and Swanson
(2006) models or the Markov-switching models can outperform the futures rates over all contract
lengths.
The out-of-sample forecasts of 1999-2006 show that, jointly across all contract lengths, the un-
adjusted futures rates cannot be outperformed by either one of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006)
risk-adjustment mechanisms or a Markov-switching framework. This conclusion diers from the
ndings of Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) and can be reconciled with the results from this paper.
Section 3.4 shows that after controlling for intermeeting rate cuts, the change in nonfarm pay-
rolls and the current futures rates do not explain much of the variation in excess returns. Models
(4) and (6) show that intermeeting rate cuts account for much of variance in the excess returns
over the 1995-2006 period. Thus, the predictability of excess returns rests on the predictability
of intermeeting rate cuts, not on the predictability of business cycles. Since intermeeting moves
are unexpected and hence not predictable by nature, excess returns are not generally predictable
over the 1995-2006 sample period. These results show that futures rates in general do not require
adjustment for excess returns except due to intermeeting moves.
114 Conclusion
This paper uses several models to examine excess returns in federal funds futures contracts over
the 1995-2006 period. The results in this paper show that futures rates do not require adjust-
ment after controlling for high-volatility periods which correlate with intermeeting rate cuts by the
FOMC. This paper also examines previous excess return models and helps clarify the relationship
between excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting moves. After accounting for the eect of
intermeeting rate cuts, business cycles do not explain much of the variation in excess returns. In
addition, excess returns are not predictable in general since intermeeting rate cuts, not business
cycles, can account for much of the variability of excess returns.
This paper also shows the importance of taking into account the change in Federal Reserve
communication policy in 1994. This policy change fundamentally alters the relationship between
business cycles and excess returns. This paper shows that using excess returns models without
the ability to control for these changes over the whole sample period can lead to results that are
not robust across subsets of that sample period. Researchers need to either use only the post-1994
sample period or use models that have the ability to capture discrete changes in the time series
properties of the excess returns over the 1988-2006 period. Hamilton (2007) shows that a model
using a t-distribution and a time trend in the variance ts the monthly excess returns data better
than a normal distribution with constant variance. This paper makes a case that discrete changes
due to policy changes and intermeeting policy moves may also need to be modeled in order to
accurately study federal funds futures contracts using monthly data.
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13A Robustness With Respect To Autocorrelation
A.1 Ordinary Least Squares By Regime
As a robustness check for autocorrelation within each regime in the Markov-switching model, I
run an ordinary least squares version of (3) by regime using Newey-West HAC standard errors
with (n   1) lags. Observations are split into the two regimes using the smoothed probability
estimates from the regime switching model. Specically, observations are included with regime i if
P[St = ij
T]  0:5 for i = 0;1. The estimates of this model appear in Table 6. The results agree
with the results of the Markov-switching framework which indicates that autocorrelation within
each regime does not drive the results.
A.2 One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) suggest an alternative specication which represents the excess returns
that would be realized if an investor buys an n-month ahead contract at time t, holds it for only
one month, and sells the contract back as an (n   1)-month ahead contract at time t + 1. Using








Although I lose one observation using equation (12), this alternative specication reduces the prob-
lem of autocorrelation in the excess returns by eliminating overlapping contracts.
A.3 Markov-Switching Average One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
To test the robustness of the previous ndings with respect to autocorrelation, I apply the Markov-
switching framework to the average one-month holding period excess returns by estimating:
rf
(n)





t+1 denotes the realized excess return of the one-month holding period of the n-month
ahead contract, (n) is a constant, St is the unobserved state variable, and "
(n)
t+1  N(0;(St)2).
The parameter estimates for equation (13) appear in Table 7 and Figure 3 contains the proba-
bility plots of being in the high-volatility regime. The switching framework again identies two
distinct regimes with dierent state-dependent variances across all contract lengths. In the high-
volatility state, the coecient estimates range from 8 basis points on the 1-month ahead contract
to almost 30 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract with all but the 2-month ahead contract
being signicant. Equation (13) also nds similar results in the low-volatility regime with small
and insignicant point estimates of (n) in all contract lengths. The probability of staying in the
same regime remains about 0.87 for the high-volatility regime for 2-month and longer contracts and
0.94 for the low-volatility regime. The probability plots of being in the high-volatility regime look
similar to the previous results. Across all contracts, the federal funds futures market enters the
14high-volatility regime in 1998 and 2000-2001. In addition, all contracts enter the low-volatility state
by 2003. Except for lack of precision in some of the 2-month ahead point estimates, the average
one-month holding period excess return results agree with the results from the excess returns of
equation (3).
A.4 Alternative OLS Model using One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
Especially in longer-term contracts, the intermeeting rate cut variable in (4) could be corresponding
to broader business cycle movements. As an alternative specication, I use the one-month holding
period excess returns and run the following regression:
rf
(n)
t+1 = (n) + (n)Dt + "
(n)
t+1: (14)
Since this specication removes overlapping contracts, Dt now only takes nonzero values for four
observations as opposed to the 4n observations of equation (4). Dt takes the value of 25 for
the September 1998 observation and 50 for the December 2000, March 2001, and August 2001
observations. The results for equation (14) appear in Table 8 and conrm my previous results.
Across all contracts, I nd a highly signicant eect of intermeeting moves by the FOMC. In all
contract lengths, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero average excess return. I am able
to explain over 36% of the variation in the 4-month ahead and shorter contracts. This result is
surprising considering Dt dummies less that 3% of my overall sample for each contract and explains
much of the variation in the one-month holding period excess returns. This result shows that after
controlling for the eect of intermeeting moves, the one-month holding period excess returns also
follow the expectations hypothesis and do not require adjustment in general.
15Table 1: Markov-Switching Average Excess Returns
High-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n)(St = 0) 7.63* 27.68* 49.72** 46.07** 68.27** 93.20**
(t-statistic) (2.20) (2.86) (5.34) (6.67) (7.00) (9.36)
(St = 0)2 153.07** 466.41 744.30* 1088.29** 1670.93** 2403.56**
(t-statistic) (4.12) (1.90) (2.04) (3.86) (3.28) (2.94)
p00 0.65 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.88
Low-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n)(St = 1) -0.04 1.13 1.44 -3.60** -5.17** -4.88*
(t-statistic) (-0.12) (1.64) (1.28) (-3.10) (-3.14) (-2.06)
(St = 1)2 8.70** 52.17** 131.47** 145.29** 285.76** 594.24**
(t-statistic) (6.09) (6.84) (6.76) (5.71) (5.86) (7.03)
p11 0.88 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.95
Note: The model is rx
(n)




t+n is the excess return of the n-month
ahead contract, (n) is a constant, St is the unobserved state variable, and "
(n)
t+n  N(0;(St)2).
Coecients appear in basis points with t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
16Table 2: Average Excess Returns with Intermeeting Rate Cuts Variable
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) 1.17* 2.10* 2.44 3.71 4.31 6.59
(t-statistic) (2.40) (2.49) (1.64) (1.37) (1.00) (0.99)
(n) 0.64** 0.93** 1.29** 1.52** 1.83** 1.99**
(t-statistic) (3.85) (6.47) (7.27) (6.36) (8.27) (10.69)
R2 0.41 0.52 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.58
Note: The model is rx
(n)




t+n is the excess return of the n-month
ahead contract, (n) is a constant, Dt is the intermeeting rate cut variable, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the
error term. Coecients appear in basis points with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
17Table 3: Swanson and Piazzesi (2006) Time-Varying Excess Return Estimates
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) -1.84 -4.23 -8.74* -15.89* -28.02** -42.81**
(t-statistic) (-1.34) (-1.63) (-1.99) (-2.51) (-2.87) (-3.15)

(n)
1 -0.02 -0.05* -0.11* -0.20** -0.33** -0.47**
(t-statistic) (-1.58) (-2.13) (-2.46) (-2.84) (-3.23) (-3.85)

(n)
2 0.02* 0.04** 0.08** 0.13** 0.21** 0.30**
(t-statistic) (2.09) (2.79) (3.03) (3.34) (3.51) (3.92)
R2 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.25












t+n is the excess return
of the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, NFPt 1 is the year-over-year change in the
logarithm of nonfarm payroll employment, f
(n)
t is the futures rate of an n-month ahead contract
at time t, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the error term. Coecients appear in basis points with HAC t-
statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
18Table 4: Swanson and Piazzesi (2006) Time-Varying Excess Return Estimates
With Intermeeting Rate Cuts Variable
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) -0.96 -2.04 -4.31 -8.23 -15.96** -27.06**
(t-statistic) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-1.43) (-1.95) (-2.88) (-4.01)

(n)
1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05* -0.10** -0.19** -0.32**
(t-statistic) (-1.16) (-1.72) (-2.37) (-2.95) (-3.59) (-4.40)

(n)
2 0.01* 0.02* 0.03** 0.06** 0.11** 0.19**
(t-statistic) (2.34) (2.59) (2.75) (3.32) (3.95) (4.82)
(n) 0.63** 0.89** 1.24** 1.42** 1.67** 1.77**
(t-statistic) (3.79) (5.65) (6.83) (5.93) (6.99) (7.46)
R2 0.42 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.67
Marginal R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10
Note: The model is rx
(n)
t+n = (n) + 
(n)









excess return of the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, NFPt 1 is the year-over-year
change in the logarithm of nonfarm payroll employment, f
(n)
t is the futures rate of an n-month
ahead contract at time t, Dt is the intermeeting rate cut variable, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the error term.
Coecients appear in basis points with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. The marginal R2 is the
increase in R2 by adding NFPt 1 and f
(n)
t to model (4) of Table 2. ** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
19Table 5: Federal Funds Rate Forecasts 1999-2006
Unadjusted Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted Markov
Futures Futures Futures With Switching
Intermeeting Average
Rate Cuts
n ME RMSE ME RMSE ME RMSE ME RMSE
1 -1.71 8.04 0.73 8.50 0.12 8.33 -19.17 40.06
2 -4.17 14.91 1.76 16.47 -0.67 15.88 -17.44 29.98
3 -7.28 23.87 1.51 28.13 -4.18 27.89 -14.19 26.92
4 -11.34 34.64 1.39 43.53 -7.78 43.80 -8.48 33.35
5 -15.93 47.31 -1.21 61.71 -14.32 61.87 -2.67 46.44
6 -21.82 62.63 -3.30 80.21 -20.11 78.04 10.39 63.43
20Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares on Average Excess Returns By Regime
High-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) 9.98** 29.09** 51.91** 48.19** 72.35** 95.46**
(t-statistic) (3.91) (5.02) (7.43) (6.23) (6.82) (6.86)
Observations 27 16 16 41 37 37
Low-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) -0.03 1.22 1.53 4.02** -4.71 -5.20
(t-statistic) (-0.10) (1.66) (1.11) (-2.68) (-1.81) (-1.31)
Observations 112 123 123 98 102 102
Note: The model is rx
(n)




t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead
contract, (n) is a constant, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the error term. Observations are split into regimes
using probability estimates from the estimation of equation (3). Coecients appear in basis points
with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1% and 5%
levels respectively.
21Table 7: Markov-Switching Average One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
High-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n)(St = 0) 8.22* 22.28 18.05* 20.61** 22.43** 29.84**
(t-statistic) (2.17) (0.84) (2.13) (3.01) (3.66) (6.03)
(St = 0)2 150.97** 445.63 330.58** 374.17** 609.78** 618.39**
(t-statistic) (3.90) (0.84) (3.12) (3.79) (4.72) (4.19)
p00 0.60 0.42 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.90
Low-Volatility Regime
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n)(St = 1) -0.35 0.14 -1.11 -1.58 -1.89 -2.04
(t-statistic) (-1.12) (0.31) (-1.59) (-1.70) (-1.55) (-1.18)
(St = 1)2 8.10** 24.62** 46.93** 76.95** 135.45** 227.02**
(t-statistic) (5.63) (6.79) (5.86) (5.17) (5.65) (6.64)
p11 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.96
Note: The model is rf
(n)




t+1 denotes the realized excess return of the
one-month holding period of the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, St is the unobserved
state variable, and "
(n)
t+1  N(0;(St)2). Coecients appear in basis points with t-statistics in
parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
22Table 8: Average One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns with Intermeeting Rate Cuts Variable
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
(n) 0.76 1.11 1.46 2.55 2.97 4.77
(t-statistic) (1.74) (1.89) (1.49) (1.81) (1.63) (1.82)
(n) 0.63** 1.10** 1.12** 1.25** 1.34** 1.23**
(t-statistic) (3.87) (5.74) (4.61) (6.46) (4.56) (4.31)
R2 0.43 0.59 0.43 0.36 0.27 0.16
Note: The model is rf
(n)




t+1 is the one-month holding period
excess return of the n-month ahead contract, (n) is a constant, Dt is the intermeeting rate
cut variable, and "
(n)
t+n denotes the error term. Coecients appear in basis points with HAC t-
statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.





































































































































































































































Note: The dashed (solid) line indicates the ltered (smoothed) probability of being in the
high-volatility regime. Each of the six panels denotes a dierent contract length estimated using
equation (3).





































































































































































































































Note: The dashed line indicates the ltered probability of being in the high-volatility regime while
shaded areas indicate contracts aected by intermeeting cuts of the federal funds rate target by
the FOMC. Each of the six panels denotes a dierent contract length estimated using equation
(3).





































































































































































































































Note: The dashed (solid) line indicates the ltered (smoothed) probability of being in the
high-volatility regime. Each of the six panels denotes a dierent contract length estimated using
equation (13).
26